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Abstract: In a simple model of a cooperative, an
increase in the price offered for the cooperative's 
product causes a reduction in m em bership and 
production. This perverse response called the Ward 
effect is often proposed as an explanation of why 
cooperatives are rare. When the model is augmented by 
allowing the cooperative to issue debt instruments 
which pay an arbitrary continuous function of the price 
of their product the Ward effect is reversed, that is, the 
cooperative has an upward sloping supply curve. In the 
model presented below, this results from the privately 
optim al decisions of a core group which is not 
concerned about efficiency or employment.
This note is the continuation o f jo int research betw een Stephen Sm ith and m yself. 
I w ou ld  like to  thank him  for stim u lating  conversations and  for teach in g  m e 
abou t the econom ics o f labour m anaged  firm s. The u sual caveat applies. O u r 
co llaboration  w as su pported  by  funds o f the R esearch C ouncil o f the E uropean 





















































































































































































I. In tro d u ctio n
If cooperatives are financed with conventional debt paying a fixed 
interest rate and are controlled by w orkers whose continued 
membership is not in doubt, the cooperative will reduce membership 
and output when the price they are offered for their product increases 
(Ward 1958, Domar 1966, Ireland and Law 1982, Bonin and Fukuda 
1986). This perverse optimal response, known as the Ward effect, is 
widely considered to be one of the principal reasons that cooperatives 
are rare. It is driven by the fact that price suprises create quasi rents 
and that current members of the cooperative benefit if they share 
speculative losses with new members and do not share speculative 
profits. Speculative losses and profits are privately undesirable, since 
risk averse members would benefit if the risk were born by investors 
with diversified portfolios. The interests of members and investors are 
better served by bonds indexed to the price of output, which enable 
investors to sell insurance to the cooperative. This paper notes that the 
use of such assets can reverse the Ward effect and cause an upward 
sloping supply response.
Below it is shown in some generality that cooperatives which 
have access to debt instruments which pay an arbitrary continuous 
function of the price of their product, will choose a financial strategy 
which makes upward sloping supply privately optimal. An earlier 
paper shows that this reversal of the Ward effect occurs if the class of 
instruments is arbitrarily restricted and if the members are sufficiently 
risk averse (Waldmann and Smith 1992). Other proposed solutions to 
the risk diversification problem have not been shown to reverse the 
Ward effect when voluntarily implemented by cooperatives controlled 
by members who care only about the members share (see e.g. McCain 
1977, Thomson 1982, Guesnerie and Laffont 1984, Suvakovic-Olgin 
1992). The result presented below is at least somewhat novel, since 
complete freedom and selfishness of members of the cooperative is 
assumed and a robust reversal of the Ward effect is obtained.
This paper has four sections the first of which is this introduction. 
The second is a fairly simple example which illustrates the claim above. 




























































































II. A M odel
There is a cooperative with some small number of members. It is 
required to pay present and future members equal shares of value 
added minus interest payments. Current members decide on financial 
and productive decisions in order to maximise their own expected 
utility. The current members are certain that they will continue to be 
members of the cooperative. Admitting new members can create a 
positive externality, benefiting new members if the share they receive is 
greater than the going wage. This presumably makes membership 
decisions inefficient. In particular if the cooperative is self financed or 
financed with ordinary debt, an increase in the price of its product will 
cause it to reduce output. This is the well known Ward effect.
Assume the cooperative can issue debt instruments which pay any 
continuous function of the price of their product. Assume that this price 
is set on competitive markets and that price risk is diversifiable. The 
privately optimal financing and output choices give an upward sloping 
supply curve. The existence of such assets would reverse the Ward 
effect if the members of cooperatives were rational utility maximisers. 
This theoretical result holds for fairly general production and utility 
functions and price distributions, the proof is by contradiction. Given 
any cooperative which has chosen a financial strategy that implies 
downward sloping supply a strictly preferable strategy with upward 
sloping supply can be described. Therefore the optimal strategy must 
involve upward sloping supply.
A simple model illustrating the above claims follows. There are 
two time periods. In period zero the cooperative issues liabilities which 
require them to pay investors a function of the price of the product in 
period 1 equal to h(p). The cooperative invests the proceeds in 
productive capital K. In period 1 the price of output p is revealed and 
the cooperative chooses membership L and produces and sells output 





























































































s = [F(L,K)-h{p)]/L (1)
The cooperative chooses h and, after p is revealed, L in order to 
maximise the expected utility of its members lf(s ). F is twice 
differentiable increasing in L and K  and concave. F (0 ,K  ) = 0. U is 
monotonically increasing in s and as noted is a function only of s. To 
shorten long equations define L(p) to be the optimal membership given 
K, price p and optimal payments to investors h(p). Define s(p) to be the 
resulting share.
If h(p) is less than or equal to zero, s is maximised at L = 0 making 
nonsense of the assumption that decisions are made by members of the 
cooperative whose continued membership is not in doubt. Therefore it 
is assumed that h(p) is positive for every p. Similarly it is assumed as is 
standard in the literature that the cooperative can always attract new 
members no matter how low s is. If the members of the cooperative are 
not very risk averse, it is possible that, for optimal plans, s will 
sometimes be zero. Clearly a minimum membership and minimum 
share should be defined. Fortunately, the proofs below show that any 
plan with downward sloping supply is inferior to another plan with the 
same distribution of membership and shares. This means that no such 
plan can be optimal with (or without) constraints on membership or 
shares.
To close the model it is necessary to decide how much investors 
are willing to pay in period zero for income h(p) in period one. This 
must be equal to K. The analysis below is valid if investors are risk 
neutral and care only about the expected value of h(p). Similarly it is 
valid if investors are risk averse but have consumption in period one 
independent of p. If so the risk in h(p) is diversifiable and investors care 
only about the expected value of h(p). Investors are assumed to care 
only about the expected value of h(p).
I will first present a fairly simple model in which p takes a finite 
number n of values each with equal probability. This simplifies the 




























































































The remainder of this section is a proof by contradiction that the 
cooperatives optimal financial and membership decisions give an 
upward sloping supply curve. Assume not, that for the optimal 
financial scheme h that there are prices Pl and p2 with Pl < p2 such that 
membership at price Pl is greater than or equal to membership at price 
Vi. In symbols
U =  L{h{p! ), K lP l) > L 2 = L(h{p2 ), K, p2 ). (2)
define s  ̂ as the share of each member when price is pj and s2 as the 
share when price is p2- Now consider a change in the cooperatives 
behavior so they have Lj members each of whom gets share S| when the 
price is p2 and have L2 members each of whom gets share s2 when the 
price is This clearly increases investors expected income by 
(p2_P i) [ f  (L-[,K)-F (L2,K  )] > 0. It clearly has no effect on members 
expected utility which depends only on the univariate distribution of s. 
It is not yet clear how this improvement can be achieved if employment 
decisions are made unilaterally by the cooperative.
Now consider a new financing scheme in which the cooperative 
pays investors h ~(p ) where
h ~(P l) = PlF (L2,K) -  L2s2 -  (P2- Pl)[F (LifK  )-F  (L2,K  )] (3)
h ~(p2) =  P2F (Lv K  ) -  LlSl
h ~(p) = h (P) otherwise
£ (h (P )) = E (h ~(p )) so investors will supply K  in either case. Assume 
the cooperative has members at price p2 and L2 members at price Pl
and the same number of members as before for other prices. If so the 




























































































probability that it will be increased by (p2~P\)[F (L^,K)-F (L2,K )]/L 2. If 
L1 is strictly greater than L2, h ~  is clearly a better financing scheme than 
h. For optimally chosen membership expected utility is at least as great 
as with the arbitrary membership assumed above and is therefore 
greater than that under the original scheme. For Lj equals L2, h ~ is an 
improvement unless the arbitrary membership happens to be optimal. 
It is not optimal as is shown below, so h ~  gives higher expected utility 
than h.
Consider s as a function of L given K  and h and p
s = [p F {L ,K )-h (p )]/L  (4)
this gives the derivative
ds/d L  = \pLFL(L,K) -  pF(L,K) + h(p)]/Lz  =  [pLFL(L,K) -  s ] /L z (5)
since L j was optimally chosen given p -j and h(p-y) the first order 
condition equation 6 holds.
PlLiF]JZ.i,K) -  Sj = 0 (6)
This means that for h~, at price p2 and employment L|, s = so the 
derivative of s with respect to L is given by equation 7.




























































































This means that L| is not the optimal employment level at price p2 with 
liabilities equal /z~(p2)- Therefore the expected utility of members of the 
cooperative is greater if they use h~(p) instead of h(p), so h(p) is not 
optimal.
This proves by contradiction that employment increases in the 
price of output if the cooperative uses optimal financial instruments 
which give liabilities as a function of p and if investors are risk neutral 
or can diversify the resulting risk away.1.
III. A M ore G eneral Proof
The assumption that p takes only a finite number of values each 
with equal probability simplifies the proof, but is not necessary at all. A 
proof for a more general distribution of p can be constructed using the 
same logic. This section presents a proof based on weaker smoothness 
and continuity assumptions.
First assume that p is distributed according to the cumulative 
distribution function G which is continuous and strictly monotonic at 
every possible value of p. That is assume that p has an atomless 
distribution w ith connected support. Assume that F is twice 
differentiable and quasi-concave with FL and FK positive and F ll and 
F k k  strictly negative. Assume that the cooperative attempts to 
maximise the expected value of U(s) for U strictly concave and that 
investors are risk neutral. Finally assume that cooperatives can issue 
any asset which pays h(p) continuous in p. The final assumption is 
particularly troublesome as it confines the allowed strategies of the 
cooperative not tastes or technology.
All these assumptions make it possible to reproduce the simple 
proof of section two for neighbourhoods of single points. Again I will
^ o t e  that w ith  the stro n g  assu m p tio n s abou t the d is tr ib u tio n  o f p , the on ly  
assum ption about F  used  in the p ro of are that it  is m on oton ically  increasing  in L 
and once d ifferentiable w ith resp ect to L. The on ly  assum ption about U (s) is that 




























































































derive a contradiction by assuming that with optimal liabilities H(p) 
there is a pi and p2 whh pj < p2 and Lj > L2. Again the basic idea will be 
to switch high and low membership levels and shares. First assume Lj > 
L2 — membership is greater at the lower price. The total derivative of 
the first order condition for membership im plies that optimal 
membership is a continuous function of p and h. The assumption that h 
is continuous implies that membership is a continuous function of p 
given 7z(p). This means that there is an e so small that employment is 
higher for all p in lpi,P i+e] than in any point in [p2 -  e, p2]. Let d be the 
lesser of G (pi+e) -  G(pj) and G(p2) -  G(p2 -  e). By the assumption that 
the support of G is connected, d must be positive. Define as 
G-1 (G(pi)+d) -  pi and e2 as p2 -  G_1(G(p2)-d). Since G is monotonic 
and continuous G-1 exists and is monotonic and continuous. For p 
between pj and p1 + define
y(p) =  G -1{G(p2) + G(p1)-G (p )} (8)
y  maps points near p  ̂ to points near p2 and maps a range of prices 
which occurs with probability d to a region which appears with 
probability d. Since G and G_1 are continuous, y  is continuous. It 
makes it possible to define and improved financing scheme h~ .
if Pi < P < V\+ e\ h~(p) = pF(L(y(p),K) -  L(y(p)s(y(P)) -  q (9)
i f  P2 ~ e2 < P < P2 h~(p ) =  pF(L(y~*(p),K) -  Ky-'ipftsiy-Hp)) -  q



























































































f o r q =  j  (y(p)-p)[F(L(p),K)-F(L(y(p)),K)]g(p)dp
P\
and g(s) = G'(s).
As in the previous example the modified scheme gives the same 
expected return to investors as the original scheme and gives higher 
expected utility to members of the cooperative. The resulting function 
h~ is continuous in p since L(p), s(p), F(L,K), y  and y-1 are continuous in 
V-
The change is very similar to the change described in section II. 
The only difference from the earlier example is that the benefits are 
distributed to the cooperative equally for all prices. This is done to 
make h~ continuous. Again the improvement proves by contradiction 
that the optimal financing scheme makes employment L and supply 
non-decreasing in price.
Again it is easy to prove that supply is strictly increasing in price. 
Assume for optimal h there are /q and p2 with pj < p2 and L(pj) = L(p2).
Since L(p) is non-decreasing membership must be constant for all p 
between pj and p2. Define h~ as above for 8 =  (G(p2)-G (p |))/2 . In 
words switch the workers shares for low and high p between p] and p2. 
As in section 2 this has no effect on investors return or on the expected 
utility of members if employment is chosen as it would be for liabilities 
h(p). Again, these employment levels are not optimal so expected utility 
is higher for h~ and optimal employment. This proves by contradiction 
that with optimal liabilities that are a continuous function of price, 
employment and supply are strictly increasing in the price of output and 




























































































IV. C onclusions and D irections for 
F u rth er R esearch
In the model presented above a cooperative is allowed to 
issue debt which pays an arbitrary continuous function of the price of 
their product. A core of members (founders) of the cooperative is 
assumed to be guaranteed continued membership and to make all 
financing decisions in order to maximise some concave function of the 
share per member. Then, when the price is revealed they are assumed 
to choose membership in order to maximise the share given the 
restriction that the share must be equal for all members. This 
separation of control and reward might be expected to cause inefficient 
behavior and indeed, in simple models where only debt paying a fixed 
return is allowed, the cooperative reduces membership and production 
when the price of its product increases. This perverse response is 
reversed when debt which pays an arbitrary continuous function of the 
price is allowed. The result that a new financial instrument eliminates 
an inefficiency which seemed to follow directly from an unrelated 
institutional restriction is very striking. The conclusion that with a little 
financial innovation cooperatives might be able to survive in market 
economies is very appealing.
Some final caveats are required however. First and most 
importantly I assumed that the price of the cooperatives product is 
observable and exogenous. If the cooperative is part of an imperfectly 
competitive industry, it could influence the price and therefore its price 
indexed debt obligations. Even if the price can't be manipulated, price 
indices by industry are generally difficult to calculate and are calculated 
with delay. This limits the potential application of the proposed 
instrument to cooperatives in competitive industries which produce a 
homogenous product.
I assumed that the risk in the price paid for the cooperatives product is 
fully diversifiable. If investors require higher expected returns for price 
indexed bonds than for regular bonds, the optimal amount of hedging 
will be reduced. I assumed that the debt instruments must pay a 




























































































influence the price at all this is clearly necessary to prevent 
manipulation. Finally I considered a two period model. In practice a 
sluggish response of membership to demand may be caused by the firing 
costs implied by membership rights. Would current members of 
cooperatives use price indexed bonds to hedge such costs and eliminate 
their effect on membership decisions ? The evaluation of the effect of 
new financial instruments on dynamic labour demand of imperfectly 
competitive cooperatives is a direction for future research.
The simple model of this paper was chosen to illustrate the most 
extreme form of perverse behavior of cooperatives proposed in the 
literature. The fact that privately optimal financial innovation can 
eliminate such behavior is very striking.
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